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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNN), while becoming the driving force of
many novel technology and achieving tremendous success in many cutting edge
applications, are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Differentiable neural com-
puter (DNC) is a novel computing machine with DNN as its central controller
operating on an external memory module for data processing. The unique ar-
chitecture of DNC contributes to its state-of-the-art performance in tasks which
requires the ability to represent variables and data structure as well as to store
data over long timescales. However, there still lacks a comprehensive study on
how adversarial examples affect DNC in terms of robustness. In this paper, we
propose metamorphic relation based adversarial techniques for a range of tasks
described in the natural processing language domain. We show that the near-
perfect performance of the DNC in bAbI logical question answering tasks can be
degraded by adversarially injected sentences. We further perform in-depth study
on the role of DNC’s memory size in its robustness and analyze the potential rea-
son causing why DNC fails. Our study demonstrates the current challenges and
potential opportunities towards constructing more robust DNCs.
Keywords: Differentiable Neural Computer · Adversarial attack · Natural Lan-
guage Processing
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, deep neural networks (DNN) experienced unprecedented rapid
development in company with the data explosion, and achieves impressive success in
matching human intelligence in many applications, such as IBM’s Watson [1], Deep-
Mind’s Atari [2] and AlphaGo [3]. However, extensive studies reveal that DNN is vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks [4,5,6,7,8,9], where imperceptible perturbations to an in-
put can cause DNN to misclassify images with high confidence. This could impede
DNN’s application especially in safety critical scenarios, and cause losses and even se-
vere tragedies if flawed DNNs are deployed to safety-critical systems (e.g., the recent
Tesla autonomous driving accident [10]). Such DNN vulnerabilities have since been
also studied in other domains such as reinforcement learning [11,12], speech recogni-
tion [13] and some natural language processing (NLP) tasks [14,15,16,17].
Differential neural computer (DNC) [18] was recently proposed as an extension of
neural Turing machine (NTM) [19], with the addition of memory attention mechanisms
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Fig. 1: (Top) Control signals from DNC with benign input can be compared with (Bottom) control
signals from DNC with adversarial input.
that control where data is stored in the memory and temporal attention that records the
order of events. Unlike the common feed-forward DNN and recurrent neural networks,
DNC is Turing complete and adopts the Von Neumann architecture with a scalable
memory module. DNC has achieved superior performance on several complex tasks that
demand the representation of data structure and storage of data over long timescales,
as demonstrated on bAbI question answering (QA) tasks, graph experiments (London
Underground and family tree) and a block puzzle solving task [18].
Many adversarial attack studies have been conducted on feed-forward DNN and
some on recurrent neural networks. Even with DNC’s promise as a more universal ap-
proach to solving machine learning tasks, there lacks a in-depth study on whether such
adversarial attacks also applied to it. Unlike common DNN, DNC separates its com-
putational and memory capabilities into a DNN central controller and memory module
respectively. This brings an opportunity to study how adversarial attacks affect the com-
putational and memory components of a neural network separately. With the augmented
memory enhancement, DNC tends to be more robust than a NTM. However, it is still
unknown how the memory contributes to DNC’s robustness against adversarial attacks.
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Gradient based adversarial techniques, from computer vision domain, do not apply
to our experiments due to discrete nature of input in the NLP domain. The replacement
of a single word can drastically alter the semantics of a text or introduce grammatical
errors. Previous NLP adversarial methods either erase or change words directly with
domain-specific rules or require human intervention [14,17,15]. To address these chal-
lenges, we propose scalable adversarial strategies that rely on metamorphic relations to
generate attacks which are grammatically sound and preserve correct answers in QA
tasks. In this paper, we demonstrate that DNC can be vulnerable to our adversarial at-
tacks on bAbI QA tasks, where it has originally achieved near-perfect performance [20].
We also find that a larger size of the memory module provides limited benefit in DNC’s
robustness against such attacks. The effectiveness of such attacks are determined by
their position, type of content and length, as shown by our experiments. Finally, we
analyze the activities of DNC controller control signals and find that adversarial attacks
disrupt the read, write and erase functions of the DNC.
The major contributions of this paper are the following: (1) First adversarial at-
tack on DNC, a neural network architecture that display state-of-the-art performance in
various tasks, that demonstrates its vulnerabilities. (2) Pick-n-Plug and Pick-Permute-
Plug: Using two new automated and scalable strategies to generate grammatically cor-
rect adversarial attacks in the NLP QA domain. (3) Evidence that larger memory size
provides limited benefit in resisting such adversarial attacks. (4) Analysis of DNC’s
control signals, as illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that adversarial attacks disrupt
the read, write and erase functions of the DNC.
2 Background and Related Work
Adversarial Attack Adversarial attacks were first discovered in computer vision do-
mains [4]. Carefully perturbed images, with changes imperceptible to humans, can eas-
ily fool DNNs. Since then, we have witnessed an arms race between attackers [21,22,23]
and defenders [24,25,26]. The presence of adversarial examples have permeated into
various computer vision tasks apart from visual classification, such as face recogni-
tion [27], object detection [28], semantic segmentation [29], generative modeling [30],
robustness testing [31,32], etc.
Although adversarial attack techniques are extensively studied in computer vision
domain, there is limited work conducted in NLP domain [15,14,17,33]. One chal-
lenge lies in the discrete nature of word inputs in NLP which makes implementation
of gradient-based perturbation methods challenging. Different from adversarial attack
for images where small pixel changes are very unlikely to alter the correct class of an
image, a change of word in a body of text may completely change the meaning of it
under a particular NLP task or introduce grammatical errors.
For adversarial attacks in NLP, Jia [15] proposed to add distracting sentences to
the original text, which are generated from the task’s question with rules. However, the
grammatical correctness and the preservation of correct answer rely on manual checks,
which makes such method difficult to scale. Word substitution based attacks [14,16,17]
were also proposed, by changing words in original text with synonyms. In [14], a por-
tion of the substituted text are interpreted by humans to be a different class, highlighting
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the challenge of creating adversaries that avoid changing the meaning of original text.
In this paper, we attempt to overcome these challenges with adversaries generated based
on metamorphic relations. Our adversarial methods are scalable and do not disrupt the
information from the original text for QA tasks.
Differential Neural Computer (DNC) A DNC is a DNN augmented with an external
memory module in the form of a matrix M ∈ RN×W [18]. The DNN of DNC acts as
the controller module, whose operations can be learn with gradient descent, while the
external memory matrix serves as a module for data storage. The DNC’s controller and
memory module are like its CPU and RAM respectively. The DNC’s memory can be
written to and accessed by the controller at each input time-step.
At a particular time-step, the DNC controller takes in an input vector xt ∈ RX, and
a set of read vectors from the previous time-step µt−1 ∈ RP.
(vt, ξt) = Controller([xt,µt−1], θc) (1)
θc is the controller’s trainable weight parameters, vt ∈ RC is the controller output while
ξt is a set of control signals.
The controller uses its write and read heads in order to manage the memory matrix.
At each time-step, the controller’s set of control signals ξt represents the operations
of these heads. These control signals can be categorized into gates, keys or vectors.
Their values determine how, where and what is being read, written and erased from
the memory matrix. A series of operations in the memory module with the control
signals and its current memory matrix Mt erase and write new data and produces a
concatenation of read vectors µt ∈ RP.
µt = MemoryModule(ξt,Mt) (2)
The final output of the DNC is a sum of weighted controller output and weighted
concatenation of read vectors from the memory module.
yt =Wvvt +Wµµt + bt (3)
where Wv ∈ RY×C, Wµ ∈ RY×P and bt ∈ RY are trainable weights of the DNC.
There are two mechanisms for writing into memory Mt: least used location and
content-based addressing. Least used location mechanism find least utilized memory
locations for new information to be written in. Content-based addressing find memory
locations which have the highest similarity with the controller’s write keys. Allocation
gate determines how much of these two mechanisms to use in order to write new infor-
mation.
For reading, there are also two mechanisms in the original DNC paper. The first is
content-based addressing which is very similar to that of the writing operation. Read
keys, rather than write keys, are used to find locations to read from. The second mech-
anism, called temporal linkage mechanism, helps retrieve information in chronological
order of when they are written. In an improved version of DNC, this mechanism is
dropped for bAbI tasks to increase its memory efficiency [20]. Free gate values are
used to forget data which were recently accessed by the controller read heads.
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bAbI Dataset DNC that we are evaluating has shown near-perfect performance on the
bAbI dataset which makes it a good candidate to evaluate the DNC’s vulnerability to
attacks. The bAbI dataset has 20 question & answer tasks of different themes to evaluate
a range of logical reasoning capabilities. Each task contains stories where each story has
one or more following questions with answers that can be derived from the story. After
removing digits from the stories, all words are converted into lower case and splitted
into word tokens. The whole vocabulary contains 156 unique words and three symbols:
‘?’, ‘.’, ‘-’. The ‘-’ is used to indicate positions in the stories where answers are required.
The performance of bAbI tasks is evaluated by word error rate (WER) which is the rate
of incorrect answers over total number of answers.
3 Metamorphic Relation-Based Adversaries
In a general classification task, a successful adversarial attack is a modified input x′ of
an original input x such that it causes the originally correct prediction y = f(x) from
a classifer f to be incorrect such that y′ = f(x′) and y′ 6= y. This definition can be
extend to NLP question answering (QA) tasks such that x and x′ can be generalized to
X and X ′, where X = [x1,x2, . . . ,xm], X ′ = [x′1,x
′
2, . . . ,x
′
m′ ] and xi,x
′
i ∈ RX are
one-hot vectors of words in the original and adversarial input sequence respectively. y
can also be extended to become Y , where Y = [y1, . . .] which is a sequence of correct
answer one-hot word vectors yi.
Metamorphic Transformation To generate adversarial attacks which do not change
the original answer to bAbI QA tasks, we draw inspiration from metamorphic relations.
An example of metamorphic relations for sine function is sin(x + pi) = sin(x). Meta-
morphic relations have been used in testing software [34] and supervised classifiers
[35]. Here, we define a metamorphic transformation T as a function that maps an input
x to x′ which satisfy a metamorphic relation with f . More formally,
x′ = T (x) f(x) = f(x′)
x is the original input and x′ is the output of a metamorphic transformation of x.
In the example of sine function where f(x) = sin (x), a valid metamorphic trans-
formation is T (x) = x + pi. Similarly, in the QA tasks, the input x and x′ can be
generalized to X and X ′, i.e., X ′ = T (X), f(X) = f(X ′), where f is an oracle that
is always correct, X = [x1,x2, ...,xm], X ′ = [x′1,x
′
2, ...,x
′
m′ ] and xi,x
′
i ∈ RX are
one-hot vectors of words in the original and transformed adversarial input sequence re-
spectively. For any input X ′ generated by the metamorphic transformation on X , the
answer f(X ′) would remain unchanged from f(X) under the oracle f .
Consider a DNN model for a QA task as f ′ where its prediction of an input sequence
X is f ′(X). If an adversarial input X ′ = T (X) is generated with a metamorphic
transformation T (i.e., f(X) = f(X ′)) such that f ′(X) 6= f ′(X ′), this would be a
successful adversarial attack.
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Pick-n-Plug A metamorphic transformation can be composed of a series of n operator
functions g1, g2, . . . , gn, such that: T (X) = gn(. . . g2(g1(X)) . . .). We propose Pick-n-
Plug which relies on metamorphic transformation Tpick−n−plug to generate adversarial
attacks. It consists of a pick operator gpick to draw adversarial sentences from a par-
ticular task (source task) and plug operator gplug to inject these sentences into a story
from another task (target task), without changing its correct answers. The gpick step to
draw sentences can be a random search, as we have demonstrated in our experiments,
or other search methods. Pick-n-Plug requires no human intervention in generating ad-
versarial attacks while ensuring grammatical correctness. Figure 2 shows an example
of successful Pick-n-Plug attack where task #19 and #3 are the target and source task
respectively. More formally,
Tpick−n−plug(X) = gplug(gpick(X)) = X ′ where
gpick(X) = (X, [S1, . . . , Sl])
gplug(X, [S1, . . . , Sl]) = X
′
where Si = [xSi1 ,x
Si
2 , . . . ,x
Si
j ] is a sequence of word vectors in an adversarial sen-
tence, l is the number of adversarial sentences picked from the source task. X ′ is an
adversarial input as the final output of the Pick-n-Plug metamorphic transformation
Tpick−n−plug. In our adversarial attacks, we identify a pair of a target task and a source
task. One or more sentences S1, . . . , Sl from the source task are picked, with an op-
erator gpick and then plugged gplug into a story from the target task, with the aim of
changing the DNC’s answer from correct to incorrect. To maintain coherence within
the injected text, blocks of consecutive sentences from the source task are used to at-
tack target stories, with the first sentence in the block being randomly sampled.
Tpick−n−plug relies on a metamorphic relation between sentences and questions
from several pairs of tasks such as task #19 and #3. Sentences from one task do not
interfere with the information expressed by sentences from another task, and hence do
not change the correct answer to their questions. For example, the directional informa-
tion contained in Sentence 1: ‘The office is south of the hallway.’ from task #19 is still
preserved even when Sentence 2: ‘Mary journeyed to the hallway.’ from task #3 is in the
same story. To illustrate, for a story containing Sentence 1, if the correct answer to the
question: ‘How do you go from the office to the hallway?’ is ‘north’, adding Sentence
2 ‘Mary journeyed to the hallway.’ to the story should not change the correct answer.
Pairs of unrelated text corpora would potentially have this property.
While using the Pick-n-Plug to attack a target task, the choice of source task, number
of injected sentences, and position of the adversarial injection can be varied. In the
following sections of this paper, we show the effect of these factors on the DNC’s
performance.
Pick-Permute-Plug We also propose Pick-Permute-Plug with metamorphic transfor-
mation Tpick−permute−plug to extend the adversarial capability of Pick-n-Plug. In Pick-
n-Plug, the diversity of adversarial injected sentences is restricted by the text of the
source task. With an additional gpermute operator after picking sentences (gpick) from
a source task, words in a particular adversarial sentence can be permuted with ‘syn-
onyms’ to generate much wider range of possible attacks. Since only words in the in
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The office is south of the hallway.
The office is north of the garden.
The kitchen is east of the bedroom.
The kitchen is north of the hallway.
The bathroom is north of the kitchen.
John travelled to the kitchen.
Mary journeyed to the hallway.
John went back to the bedroom.
John went to the garden.
How do you go from the office to the kitchen?
Answer: n, n
DNC predicts: s, e
Successful Adversarial Attack
Fig. 2: A successful Pick-n-Plug attack on target
task #19 with source task #3, where the adver-
sarial sentences (in bold) are picked from task #3
and injected right before the question, after the
story. In the presence of these adversarial sen-
tences the DNC predicts ‘s’, ‘e’ which stands for
‘South’ and then ‘East’. The DNC correctly pre-
dicts ‘n’, ‘n’ (‘North’ then ‘North’) without ad-
versarial sentences.
adversarial sentences are permuted, the correct answer is still preserved. gpermute can
optionally rely on the original input X to influence S′1, .., S
′
l according to conditions
such as to enforce similar grammatical tense or style of writing. The Pick-Permute-
Plug metamorphic transformation can be summarized as:
Tpick−permute−plug(X) = gplug(gpermute(gpick(X))) = X ′
where gpick(X) = (X, [S1, . . . , Sl])
gpermute(X, [S1, . . . , Sl]) = (X, [S
′
1, . . . , S
′
l ])
gplug(X, [S
′
1, . . . , S
′
l ]) = X
′
and S′i = [x
S′i
1 ,x
S′i
2 , . . . ,x
S′i
j ] is an adversarial sentence from the permute step such
that S′i 6= Si if one or more of its words have been substituted with synonyms.
In the same example above, the word ‘hallway’ in Sentence 2: ‘Mary journeyed to
the hallway.’ can be substituted with ‘office’ under the gpermute operator to generate
Sentence 3: ‘Mary journeyed to the office.’, before injecting into the story. For a story
containing Sentence 1, if the correct answer to the question: ‘How do you go from the
office to the hallway?’ is ‘north’, adding Sentence 3 to the story should also not change
the correct answer. Other words can also be selected to be permuted such as substitut-
ing the name word ’Mary’ in Sentence 3 with ’John’. The added flexibility allows for
more control of the target DNC’s predictions and behaviors with wider range of pos-
sible changes in the input sequence. In practice, the permute step could be executed
by greedily permuting synonyms over the Pick-Permute-Plug process iteratively with
respect to the DNC’s output confidence, in order to induce prediction of a target output
with high confidence.
4 Experiments
4.1 DNC Robustness against Adversarial Framework
Experiment Setup We conduct in-depth evaluation on the robustness of DNC using
our adversarial framework. The DNC was jointly trained on en-10k data subset of all
20 bAbI tasks and obtained near-perfect performance in all the tasks. We conduct the
following evaluations on the DNC model that was pretrained on all tasks and publicly
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released in [20]. In our adversarial attacks, we select 4 representative tasks (#3, #15,
#16 and #19) of bAbI tasks to form 12 target-source task pairs and evaluate the DNC’s
robustness on them.
Table 1: Word error rate (%) of DNC on task # 3, 15, 16 and 19 under Plug-n-Pick attacks. Test
error rate without adversarial sentences for task # 3, 15, 16 and 19 are 1.6%, 0% , 0% and 0%,
respectively. ‘Full Block’ adversarial injection means that a complete sequence of sentences from
a sampled source task story is injected as adversarial sentences.
Source Position
# of Adversarial Sentences
Full Block
1 2 3 4
Under Adversarial Attacks on Task 3
#15
before story 3.6 2.8 3.3 4.8 21.0
before question 2.7 2.9 3.6 5.9 22.4
#16
before story 4.6 3.9 4.9 8.1 23.9
before question 2.5 2.6 4.4 6.3 26
#19
before story 4.5 6.7 8.3 9.5 12.0
before question 6.4 10.5 15.2 20.4 26.5
Under Adversarial Attacks on Task 15
#3
before story 0.6 5 9.6 13.6 88.4
before question 0.7 3.9 8.4 13.9 98.5
#16
before story 1.9 6.6 13.3 24.2 56.4
before question 1.4 5.4 11.9 23.1 60.3
#19
before story 4.4 22.4 40.9 53.7 64.2
before question 3.3 17.8 37.5 55 65.8
Under Adversarial Attacks on Task 16
#3
before story 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.7 24.5
before question 0.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 94.2
#15
before story 2.8 2 3.9 7.7 27.4
before question 0.2 1 1.8 2.5 12.9
#19
before story 1.3 1.9 2.6 4.3 5.4
before question 0.6 2.5 4.1 6.9 10.8
Under Adversarial Attacks on Task 19
#3
before story 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.85 10.2
before question 0.3 0.5 1.05 1.75 51.4
#15
before story 0.55 1.2 4 7.15 28.6
before question 0.9 2.95 8.55 14.8 37.0
#16
before story 0.4 2.4 4.45 6.75 19.1
before question 0.6 2.85 5.5 9.1 36.1
The pick step is implemented as a random search for non-question sentences. To
investigate the upper limit of the Pick-n-Plug adversarial effect, we also consider a
scenario where bodies of text from the source task are picked from a story’s start to the
right before its first question, with no limit on the number of sentences.
Results & Discussion
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Injection Position For both target tasks and all source tasks, when the number of
adversarial sentences are larger, the adversarial sentences inserted right before questions
have created stronger attack than sentences inserted at the start of the story, shown in
Table 1. For some cases where the number of adversarial sentences are smaller, the
adversarial effect at the position before the story is larger.
Intuitively, the effect of adversarial sentences inserted at the beginning of the story
can be thought as to kick-start the DNC in the wrong direction to focus on details
of the story that are not relevant in correctly answering the question. In contrast, the
adversarial sentences right before the question might cause the DNC to erase data in
its memory that is important to correctly answer the question at the end, as a price of
storing data from the relatively more recent adversarial sentences. This implies that, as
the length of adversarial sentences increases, the effect of the adversarial sentences in
overwriting relevant data outweighs the effect of starting off the DNC’s attention to the
less relevant direction.
Source Task Adversarial sentences from source task #19 generally degrade the DNC’s
performance more than adversarial sentences from other source task (#3, 15 and 16). A
possible explanation may be that the distracting strength of adversarial sentences lies
in the amount of information they carry. In task #19, directional relationships between
two location are expressed in each sentence. This translates to change to two entities’
attribute per sentence. For example, a sentence from task #19 like “The office is east of
the garden.” encodes that for the ‘office’ entity’s attribute that is east of ‘garden’ and
the ‘garden’ entity’s attribute that it is west of ‘office’.
In task #3, #15 and #16, only one attribute of a single object such as its location
(#3) or its identity (#15) is altered per sentence. This means that sentences from task
#19 carry almost twice the amount of information about entities than sentences from
#3, #15 and #16, explaining the stronger adversarial effect. It implies that adversarial
sentences, within a word limit, generally have a more potent effect if the amount of
information encoded is maximized in these sentences.
Number of Adversarial Sentences For target tasks and all source tasks, adversarial
blocks with more sentences generally contribute to more powerful adversarial attack in
causing the DNC to predict incorrect answers. It can be interpreted intuitively that the
adversarial effect of DNC storing irrelevant data and overwriting important information
gets more pronounced with increasing amount of adversarial information.
In the case where the number of sentences is limited to 4, the DNC’s performance
in task #15 degrade from 0% to 55% when attacked with task #19 adversarial sentences
injected right before the question. In the case where blocks of contiguous sentences
from source task stories are injected without sentence limit, the DNC degrades from a
perfect test performance of 0% error to 98.5% in target task #15.
4.2 Role of DNC Memory Module in Robustness
The memory module in DNC contributes its state-of-the-art performance in bAbI tasks,
but is still unknown what its role is in resisting adversarial attacks. Since one possible
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effect of adversarial sentences is to overwrite relevant stored information, a bigger size
of the DNC’s memory module might mitigate this effect by having more free space to
write new information rather than overwriting these important data.
In the DNC architecture, its controller is meant to work with memory module of
different sizes as long as the dimensionality of each memory row is the same. Since the
learned parameters of DNC’s controller are compatible with any number of rows the
memory module can have, we use the same DNC’s controller for all memory sizes.
We carry out adversarial attacks with Pick-n-Plug on DNC of memory size 0.5x,
0.75x, 1x, 2x, 4x, 8x, 16x and 32x of the original 192 memory rows. In one of the
attacks, blocks of 4 adversarial sentences are injected before the question of the target
task. In a stronger attack, one separate block of 4 adversarial sentences is injected before
the question and another before the start of the target story. We carry out these attacks
on target task #3 using adversarial source task #19 and vice versa.
The performance of DNC with these memory sizes are also evaluated on clean test
dataset.
Results & Discussion Our evaluation results show that memory size plays a limited
role in DNC’s resistance against adversarial attacks from Pick-n-Plug, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The error rates of DNC drip to a minimum (9% to 24% reduction in error from
the original memory size) in our experiments when memory size is either 2x or 1.5x of
its original.
However, as the memory size increases further, the adversarial error rates increase
even past the original error rate. This implies that there is still a significant robustness
gap that larger DNC’s memory size cannot close. The error rate of the DNC stands at
15.6% at its maximum robustness when task #3 is attacked by block of 4 adversarial
sentences injected before the question.
Its performance on clean test samples is also degraded, also shown in Figure 3. This
seems to occur earlier than the degradation of performance under adversarial attacks.
An explanation for this might be that the DNC controller was not trained to optimally
handle memory modules of sizes too far from its original size, even though they are
compatible. This degradation due to unfamiliarity of DNC’s controller with increasing
memory size may outweigh the robustness benefit that larger memory size can offer,
resulting in a maximum robust performance point close to the original memory size,
1.5 to 2x in our experiments.
4.3 Adversarial Effect on DNC Controller Activities
We investigate the behaviors of DNC controller under different inputs, 1) clean input
(CE), 2) unsuccessful adversarial attack (UAA), and 3) successful adversarial attack
(SAA), by probing its control signals. The DNC controller outputs control signals to
determine how, where and what content that is read, written and erased from the DNC
memory module. These control signals comprise 3 gates, 2 keys and 2 vectors. Gate
values are scalar that range from 0 to 1, while keys and vectors are W-dimensional
vectors with real values.
The free gate value determines how much of recently accessed information to for-
get. Allocation gate shows how much the location of written content is influenced by
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Fig. 3: (L) Word error rate (%) of DNC with different sizes of augmented memory module on
target task #3 with adversarial source task #19, and (R) on target task #19 with adversarial source
task #3.
availability of space in that location rather than the relevance with the information al-
ready stored in that location. The write gate determines how much to write into memory
at a particular time step.
The write key and read key guide to memory locations with highest similarity to
write new data and read stored information, respectively. Write vector and erase vector
are the two vector values which determine what content to write into and erase from the
memory, respectively.
We can probe how DNC controller’s behaviors change by comparing how the con-
trol signals deviate under one input sequence to another. In our experiments, we com-
pare the signals under different inputs with pairwise similarity metrics in such fashion:
clean example with unsuccessful adversarial attack (CE-UAA), clean example with suc-
cessful adversarial attack (CE-SAA), and unsuccessful adversarial attack with success-
ful adversarial attack (UAA-SAA). The UAA is an example where the DNC’s input
sequence contains injected adversarial sentences and it still predicts the correct answer
to the question. In SAA, the DNC predicts the incorrect answer.
For similarity comparison of 2 sequences of scalar values, like the gate values, we
can use normalized KL-divergence. We can use cosine similarity to compare vector-
based control signals like the write/read keys and write/erase vectors.
Every DNC input sequence in our experiments contain a story part and a question
part. For an adversarial input sequences, we can further differentiate the story part into
its clean and adversarial segments, to have a more fine grained picture of the control
signals. We compared the DNC control signals under these separate parts of input se-
quence.
Here, we describe how we sampled a CE, UAA and SAA that are closely related for
a meaningful comparison. First, an UAA is sampled from a Pick-n-Plug run on target
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Fig. 4: (Top-Down) The free gate, allocation gate, and write gate values of DNC’s read heads
when the input sequence is (Row 1) an unsuccessful adversarial input, (Row 2) a clean example,
and (Row 3) a successful adversarial input.
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task #19 that picks 4 adversarial sentences from source task #3, and inject them right
before every question. To generate closely related versions of this UAA sample, we
conduct a run of Pick-Permute-Plug where 4 location words in this UAA’s adversarial
sentences are permuted with a set of 8 synonyms in a brute force manner, while the rest
of the adversarial sentences remains the same. Among these new adversarial examples
which successfully caused the DNC to predict incorrect answer, a SAA was sampled.
The CE equivalent of the UAA and SAA is one with all 4 adversarial sentences re-
moved. All words in the story and question segments of CE, UAA and SAA are the
same. In the adversarial segments of UAA and SAA, up to 4 of the location words can
differ while the other words and length of the word sequences are the same.
Results & Discussion For all pair-wise comparisons and for all of DNC’s controller
keys and vectors (see Table 2), the mean cosine similarities at the story segment are
significantly higher than the mean cosine similarities at the question segment. This in-
dicates that the main adversarial effect in disrupting the DNC’s controller keys and
vectors emerge mainly at sections after the adversarial sentences are injected rather
than before that, despite DNC controller’s bidirectional architecture.
When compared with CE, the cosine similarities of controller keys and vectors from
SAA is lower than that from UAA. This suggests that the keys and vectors from a clean
example are disrupted more under a successful attack than an unsuccessful one.
When comparing the DNC’s controller keys and vectors under UAA and SAA, the
cosine similarities between all of them - the write keys, read keys, write vectors and
erase vectors - are lowest in the adversarial segment. Upon closer look into the cosine
similarities of these keys and vectors in the adversarial segment, we can see from Figure
5 that there are some sharp dips in the similarities of the keys and vectors. These dips are
at the time-step where the input words are different. The four dips correspond to [‘hall-
way’, ‘bathroom’, ‘hallway’, ‘park’] in the UAA and [‘kitchen’, ‘hallway’, ‘bedroom’,
‘garden’] in the SAA.
Looking at the cosine similarities at question segment, there is a sharp dip at the end
where the answer is expected from the DNC, while the similarities are relatively stable
at previous time steps. This suggests that the adversarial sentences has a latent effect
on the keys and vectors which emerges in critical segments such as when information
is retrieved to answer a question. This latent effect is very likely to be strengthened by
the DNC memory module since it excels in storage of information. These observations
indicate that disruptions to these keys and vectors, which are involved in DNC’s write,
read and erase operations, play a part of the overall adversarial effect from a successful
attack. For gate values, we find no obvious difference between the patterns of the gate
values when DNC is presented with a CE, UAA and SAA from a general view (see
Figure 4).
When the KL-divergence is used to compare the gate values, significant patterns
appear at the different segments of the input sequences. For all 3 type of gate values
at the story segment (see Table 3), the KL-divergence of all pair-wise comparisons are
significantly lower than the KL-divergence at the question segment, with 2 to 3 order
of magnitude difference. This implies that the main adversarial effect on DNC’s 3 gate
values emerge after the injection of adversarial sentences, rather than before that.
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Fig. 5: Cosine similarity of DNC’s keys and vectors, between when the DNC is presented with
a unsuccessful adversarial attack and when it is presented with a successful adversarial attack.
(Top left) The cosine similarity values at the story, (Top right) adversarial portion, and (Bottom)
question of a sample QA from task #19.
Table 2: Mean cosine similarity between DNC’s keys and vectors as a comparison how different
these control signals are with different inputs. The input can be a clean example (CE), unsuccess-
ful adversarial attack (UAA) or successful advers. attack (SAA).
Story Adversary Question
Write Keys
CE-UAA 0.9969 - 0.9790
CE-SAA 0.9962 - 0.9627
UAA-SAA 0.9997 0.8593 0.9689
Read Keys
CE-UAA 0.9981 - 0.9749
CE-SAA 0.9980 - 0.9652
UAA-SAA 0.9999 0.8417 0.9737
Write Vectors
CE-UAA 0.9988 - 0.9799
CE-SAA 0.9988 - 0.9653
UAA-SAA 0.9999 0.7400 0.9761
Erase Vectors
CE-UAA 0.9996 - 0.9975
CE-SAA 0.9995 - 0.9942
UAA-SAA 1.000 0.9660 0.9957
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Table 3: KL-divergence of DNC controller’s gate values to compare how they changes with dif-
ferent inputs.The input can be a clean example (CE), unsuccessful adversarial attack (UAA) or
successful adversarial attack (SAA). Free gate values from only 1 of the 4 DNC’s read heads are
compared here. The KL-divergences of free gate values from the other 3 read heads show similar
spread of maximum values.
Story Adversary Question
Free Gate
CE-UAA 3.735E-05 - 0.002472
UAA-CE 3.710E-05 - 0.002515
CE-SAA 2.526E-05 - 0.02041
SAA-CE 2.529E-05 - 0.01566
UAA-SAA 2.212E-06 0.005523 0.02470
SAA-UAA 2.234E-06 0.006529 0.01791
Alloc Gate
CE-UAA 0.0003625 - 0.001112
UAA-CE 0.0003883 - 0.001184
CE-SAA 0.0003089 - 0.01512
SAA-CE 0.0003319 - 0.01148
UAA-SAA 3.730E-06 0.2279 0.02437
SAA-UAA 3.760E-06 0.1596 0.01682
Write Gate
CE-UAA 0.0003325 - 0.005531
UAA-CE 0.0003171 - 0.005586
CE-SAA 0.0002664 - 0.007648
SAA-CE 0.0002548 - 0.007347
UAA-SAA 1.369E-05 0.2408 0.001681
SAA-UAA 1.389E-05 0.1101 0.001621
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At the question segment, the KL-divergence of DNC’s gate values from CE under
SAA is higher than that under UAA for all the 3 gate types. This suggests that the gate
values deviate more from a clean input under a successful attack than an unsuccessful
one. These two observations on the gate values, in the story and question segments,
resonates with the above observations on the controller keys and vectors in these word
segments.
When comparing the DNC’s gate values under UAA and SAA, the KL-divergence
of the allocation and write gate values in the adversarial segment is the largest. This
might be due to the presence of 4 different location words in the adversarial sentences
of UAA and SAA. In contrast, the KL-divergence of free gate values is larger in the
question segment than in the story or adversarial segment, despite the fact that the words
in UAA’s and SAA’s question segment are the same. This implies that the adversarial
sentences have different effects on the gate control signals. These observations suggest
that disruptions to these gates, which are responsible for the DNC’s erase and write
operations, play a part of the overall adversarial effect from a successful attack.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a metamorphic relation based adversarial attack framework
for DNCs, and show its attacks can cause multi-faceted disruptive effects on the read,
write and erase functions of the DNC. Our in-depth evaluation on bAbI logical question
answering task demonstrates that the current DNCs still face robustness issues, despite
with larger memory size. We hope our framework motivates more work about adversar-
ial attacks in NLP and more extensive studies on DNCs, towards constructing robust,
automatically programmed, general purpose learning machines.
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